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LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
Scope: litigation and legal advice
The modern case law on legal professional privilege has
divided the privilege into two categories:
(a) litigation privilege, protecting confidential
communications – between lawyers, clients and third
parties – made for the purposes of litigation; and
(b) legal advice privilege, protecting confidential
communications between lawyers and their clients
whereby legal advice, whether connected with litigation
or not, is sought or given.
For the scope of litigation privilege, the meaning to be
attached to ‘litigation’ is key. The House of Lords has
already made clear that litigation in this context does not
extend to non-adversarial proceedings, such as care
proceedings (re L (A Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege)
[1997] AC 16). Likewise, for the scope of legal advice
privilege, the meaning to be attached to ‘legal advice’ is key.
The authorities have been reviewed and summarised thus:
“legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it
must include advice as to what should prudently and
sensibly be done in the relevant legal context” (Balabel v Air
India [1988] Ch 317, 330 per Taylor LJ).
Nature: an absolute guarantee of confidentiality
Privilege recognises the public interest in a person’s
being able to consult a legal adviser in absolute confidence.
The effect of a successful claim of privilege is stark. Subject
only to waiver by the client, or express ousting by statute
(cf R (Morgan Grenfell Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax
[2003] 1 AC 563), the privilege is absolute. As Lord Reid
noted in Duke of Argyll v Duchess of Argyll (1962 SC (HL) 88):
“the effect, and indeed the purpose, of the law of
confidentiality is to prevent the court from ascertaining the
truth so far as regards those matters which the law holds to
be confidential.”
But this could give the impression that privilege is simply
a rule of evidence – permitting or requiring the
withholding of certain material from one’s opponent and
the court. But it has a greater significance. In R v Derby
Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B [1996] AC 487, Lord Taylor of
Gosforth CJ said:
“Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an
ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts
of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which
the administration of justice as a whole rests.”
Similarly, in R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special
Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563-Lord
Hoffmann described legal professional privilege as: “a
fundamental human right long established in the common
law.”
Of course, there is plainly a competing public interest in
keeping privilege within proper bounds. Nevertheless, it is
no part of a court’s role to weigh the claim of privilege in
any particular case against another public interest, such as
the public interest in a fair trial. As Lord Taylor noted in R
v Derby Magistrates Court, ex parte B [1996] AC 487:
“If a balancing exercise were ever required in the case of legal
professional privilege, it was performed once and for all in the
sixteenth century, and since then has applied across the board
in every case, irrespective of the client’s individual merits.”
This means that litigation which sets the bounds of
privilege by defining the balance between these competing
public interests assumes a particular importance. And
within that litigation, the underlying policy justification for
the privilege itself assumes a particular importance,
because it is the weight of that justification that will
determine where the balance lies. The difference between
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the present
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In the latest episode in the BCCI saga, the recent House of Lords’
decision on legal professional privilege (Three Rivers District Council
v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48) is a welcome restoration
of orthodoxy in relation to legal advice privilege. But the House
declined to address wider concerns raised by an earlier decision of the
Court of Appeal, and foreshadowed further judicial reassessment of
the scope and justification of litigation privilege.
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case is reducible to differing views of this policy
justification.
THREE RIVERS: BACKGROUND TO THE
DISCLOSURE LITIGATION
The factual background to the Three Rivers litigation
should, by now, need little rehearsal. Following the collapse
of BCCI in July 1991 and the subsequent Bingham Inquiry
into the Bank of England’s supervision of BCCI, the
claimants (creditors of BCCI) are seeking redress from the
Bank of England (“the Bank”). In order to establish
liability for misfeasance in public office, the claimants must
establish that the collapse of BCCI is attributable to acts or
omissions of the Bank “in bad faith” (s 1(4) Banking Act
1987). Accordingly, they sought disclosure of large
numbers of documents relating to the Bingham Inquiry
from the Bank; and the present satellite litigation arose
from the Bank’s resistance to that disclosure on the
grounds of privilege.
As there was never any suggestion that the Bingham
Inquiry was anything other than inquisitorial, the Bank
made no claim to resist disclosure based on litigation
privilege; its resistance to disclosure was based solely on
legal advice privilege. This presented the courts with two
questions on the scope of legal advice privilege:
(a) who was the client of the legal advisers advising the
Bank?
(b) was their advice ‘legal advice’ for the purposes of
privilege?
The first of these was addressed in Three Rivers (No 5);
the second in Three Rivers (No 6).
THREE RIVERS (NO 5): IN THE HIGH
COURT
For the purposes of co-ordinating its contribution to the
Bingham Inquiry, the Bank of England had set up a small
internal group – the Bingham Inquiry Unit (BIU). The
Bank had also engaged Freshfields solicitors, and counsel,
to advise on all its dealings in relation to the Bingham
Inquiry.
The claimants first sought disclosure of documents
created by Bank employees, and ex-employees, for the
purpose of being passed by the BIU to Freshfields. Three
Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No 5) [2002] EWHC 2730, Tomlinson J
described these documents (in para [10]) as:
“... generated for the purpose of providing information to the
Bank’s legal advisers to enable them to prepare submissions
and/or to advise on the nature, presentation, timing and/or
content of the Bank’s submissions to, evidence for and
responses to requests from the inquiry.”
He held that:
“an internal confidential document, not being a
communication with a third party, which was produced or
brought into existence with the dominant purpose that it or
its contents be used to obtain legal advice is privileged from
production.”
In a subsequent addendum to his judgment, he held that
documents prepared by ex-employees and ex-officers of
the Bank stood on the same footing, for legal advice
privilege purposes, as documents prepared by current
employees and officers.
THREE RIVERS (NO 5): IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL
The claimants appealed against the High Court decision,
and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal ([2003] QB
1556). It concluded that legal advice privilege only
protected communications between lawyer and client, not
lawyer and third party; and that Freshfields’ client for these
purposes was the BIU, and no-one else. Documents
originating anywhere in the Bank other than the BIU, even
if they were brought into existence with a view to their
communication to Freshfields, were not subject to legal
advice privilege. This conclusion was determinative of the
appeal.
Although not necessary for its decision, and despite not
having heard specific argument addressed to it on the
point, the Court of Appeal then went further. It also
indicated that the material in question was anyway
prepared “for the dominant purpose of putting relevant
factual material before the inquiry in an orderly and
attractive fashion, not for the dominant purpose of taking
legal advice upon such material”, and so could not, by its
nature, attract legal advice privilege (see para [37]).
The Bank was refused permission to appeal to the
House of Lords, and the process of disclosure in
accordance with the Court of Appeal’s judgment
commenced. But the Bank still refused to disclose:
(a) any communications between the BIU and Freshfields,
or
(b) any material relating to the preparation of the
overarching statement that had been submitted to the
inquiry on behalf of the Bank.
This refusal was on two grounds. First, the claimants had
told the Court of Appeal that they were not seeking
disclosure of any communications between the BIU and
Freshfields, as it was accepted that they were covered by
legal advice privilege. Secondly, the Bank argued that “legal
advice” in the Court of Appeal’s declaration should be
interpreted widely so as to cover all advice and assistance
from Freshfields or counsel relating to the evidence to be
submitted and the submissions to be made to the inquiry
on behalf of the Bank. This advice became labelled as
“presentational advice”.6
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THREE RIVERS (NO 6): IN THE HIGH
COURT
In the light of the obiter comments in the earlier Court
of Appeal judgment, and despite the claimants’ earlier
assurances in the Court of Appeal that they were not
seeking its disclosure, the claimants went before Tomlinson
J again to obtain discovery of the ‘presentational advice’
material.
In Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the
Bank of England (No 6) [2003] EWHC 2565, he held that
the rationale of the Court of Appeal judgment in Three
Rivers (No 5) was that the seeking or giving of advice for
presentational purposes should not in general be
categorised as legal advice of the sort which attracted
privilege. He felt constrained to order that the only
documents or parts of documents that the Bank was
entitled to withhold were those passing between the BIU
and Freshfields for the purpose of seeking or obtaining
“advice concerning the Bank’s rights and obligations”.
THREE RIVERS (NO 6): IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL
The Bank appealed against this narrow interpretation of
“legal advice”. On March 1, 2004 the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal (Three Rivers District Council v Governor
and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2004] QB 916).
Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Phillips MR did
agree with the Bank that the Court of Appeal’s earlier
decision did not constrain Tomlinson J in the way he
thought he was constrained. However, the Court then
concluded its own consideration of the concept of “legal
advice” by agreeing that for these purposes, it was to be
narrowly construed as being restricted to advice
concerning the client’s legal rights and obligations such as
are capable of being the subject of litigation.
This was essentially a policy decision, but one which
found support in some authorities. Lord Brougham LC, in
Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98, had explained the
reason for legal advice privilege:
“a person at times requires the aid of professional advice upon
the subject of his rights and liabilities, with no reference to
any particular litigation, and without any other reference to
litigation generally than all human affairs have, in so far as
every transaction may, by possibility, become the subject of
judicial inquiry.”
In Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, Sir George
Jessel MR had said:
“The protection [afforded by privilege] is of a very limited
character, and in this country is restricted to the obtaining the
assistance of lawyers, as regards the conduct of litigation of
the rights to property.”
The court examined the authorities relied on by the
Bank, and said (at para [25]):
“All of the cases to which we have been thus far referred were
ones in which the relationship of client and solicitor arose in
relation to transactions involving legal rights and obligations
capable of becoming the subject matter of litigation. We have
been referred to no case in which legal advice privilege has
been established where this was not the case.”
The court also prayed in aid the 1967 Report of the Law
Reform Committee on Privilege in Civil Proceedings. That
had described legal advice privilege as “a privilege in aid of
litigation”, and continued:
“19. What distinguishes legal advice from other kinds of
professional advice is that it is concerned exclusively with
rights and liabilities enforceable in law, ie in the ultimate
resort by litigation in the courts or in some administrative
tribunal. It is, of course, true that on many matters on which
a client consults his solicitor he does not expect litigation and
certainly hopes that it will not occur; but there would be no
need for him to consult his solicitor to obtain legal advice
unless there were some risk of litigation in the future in
connection with the matter upon which advice is sought. As
Lord Brougham pointed out, it is to minimise that risk by
ensuring that he so conducts his affairs as to make it
reasonably certain that he would succeed in any litigation
which might be brought in connection with them, that the
client consults his solicitor at all.”
For its policy decision to take a restrictive view of legal
advice, the court drew support from the analysis of Taylor
LJ in Balabel. Taylor LJ had said:
“… those dicta in the decided cases which appear to extend
privilege without limit to all solicitor and client
communications upon matters within the ordinary business of
a solicitor and referable to that relationship are too wide. It
may be that the broad terms used in the earlier cases reflect
the restricted range of solicitors’ activities at the time. Their
role would then have been confined for the most part to that
of lawyer and would not have extended to business adviser or
man of affairs. To speak therefore of matters ‘within the
ordinary business of a solicitor’ would in practice usually have
meant the giving of advice and assistance of a specifically legal
nature. But the range of assistance given by solicitors to their
clients and of activities carried out on their behalf has greatly
broadened in recent times and is still developing. Hence the
need to re-examine the scope of legal professional privilege
and keep it within justifiable bounds. ([1988] Ch 317,
331–2).”
This passage was accepted by counsel for both sides in
the House of Lords as “at best, an over-simplification”:
see Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at para [58]. To this,
the Court of Appeal added (at para [30]):
“We agree with this observation of Taylor LJ to the effect that
in circumstances where the traditional role of a solicitor has
expanded, it is necessary to keep legal professional privilege
within justifiable bounds. The fact the work done is within
what may be the ordinary business of a solicitor does not 7
Amicus Curiae Issue 59 May/June 2005
A
rticle
A
rticle
necessarily mean that it attracts privilege. This case raises the
question of the scope of the ‘justifiable bounds’.”
The court drew a bright-line distinction (at para [26]):
“… where a solicitor-client relationship is formed for the
purpose of obtaining advice or assistance in relation to rights
and liabilities, broad protection will be given to
communications passing between solicitor and client in the
course of that relationship. … We do not consider that the
same principle applies to communications between solicitor
and client when the dominant purpose is not the obtaining of
advice and assistance in relation to legal rights and
obligations.”
The court described its decision not in terms of a
limitation on legal advice privilege, but as a refusal to
extend it (paras [36]–[37]). However, Lord Phillips MR
concluded with the following observations (at para [39]):
“We have found this area of law not merely difficult but
unsatisfactory. The justification for litigation privilege is
readily understood. Where, however, litigation is not
anticipated it is not easy to see why communications with a
solicitor should be privileged. Legal advice privilege attaches to
matters such as the conveyance of real property or the drawing
up of a will. It is not clear why it should. There would seem
little reason to fear that, if privilege were not available in such
circumstances, communications between solicitor and client
would be inhibited. Nearly fifty years have passed since the
Law Reform Committee looked at this area. It is perhaps time
for it to receive a further review.”
Clearly, then, the court’s instinct was not only that any
extension of legal advice privilege should be resisted. It felt
that the balance of interests between the public interest in
a fair trial and the public interest in confidential legal
advice should swing in favour of the former by restricting
legal advice privilege.
THREE RIVERS (NO 6): IN THE HOUSE OF
LORDS
Introduction
The Court of Appeal’s decision was a narrow one, on the
single issue of the meaning of “legal advice”. However, the
decision – including Lord Phillips MR’s dicta quoted above
– occasioned wide concern among the legal and
governmental communities. This was so, even though the
foundations for the decision clearly lay in the earlier Court
of Appeal decision in Three Rivers (No 5). Because of this
wide concern, the Government (through the Attorney
General), the Bar Council and the Law Society were all
given leave to intervene in the appeal to the House of Lords
by written submissions.
For the Bank’s part, it argued its case on two bases. First,
it argued that the Court of Appeal was wrong to define the
scope of legal advice privilege as narrowly as it did.
Secondly, it argued that its communications with
Freshfields in relation to “presentational advice” fell within
even the narrow definition of ‘legal advice’ put forward by
the Court of Appeal.
For the interveners’ part, they too expressed concern at
the narrowness of the scope of “legal advice” as set out by
the Court of Appeal. They also invited the House of Lords
to clarify, following the earlier decision in Three Rivers (No
5), the approach that should be taken to determine
whether a communication by an employee to his
employer’s legal advisers was from the client or from a
third party.
The Government also expressed concern on two further
counts. The first related to the effectiveness of inquiries. It
is widely recognised that inquiries, which are becoming
more prevalent, are more effective if those giving evidence
to them have the benefit of legal advice (see, for example,
the “Salmon principles”, set out in the Report of the Royal
Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, 1966, chaired by
Salmon LJ (Cmnd 3121)). This is so, even if the inquiry
will not have any consequence for the witness’s legal rights
and obligations, although in the absence of such
consequence, and if the Court of Appeal’s narrow
definition of ‘legal advice’ were to prevail, a witness’s
communications with his lawyer concerning his evidence
would not be privileged. This would be likely to deter the
seeking of legal advice by potential witnesses to inquiries,
with a deleterious impact on their effectiveness.
The second concern related to the Government’s
position as a consumer of legal services, from both
employed and independent legal advisers. The legal advice
it receives may often be on the rights and obligations of the
citizen (either in general or in a particular case), rather
than those of the Government; and legal advice plays an
important role in both the policy-making and legislative
processes – where, by definition, the rights and obligations
of the Government, being not yet created, are not engaged.
The public interest in the Government’s receiving
confidential legal advice – both on policy development and
in non-justiciable matters such as international affairs – is
well established.
On July 29, 2004, after only some 10 minutes’
deliberation following the end of counsels’ speeches, their
Lordships announced that they would allow the Bank’s
appeal. Reasons were given on November 11, 2004, with
substantial speeches being given by Lord Scott of Foscote,
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry and Lord Carswell.
Policy justification for legal advice privilege
Confidential communications arise in many
circumstances – doctor and patient; accountant and client;
priest and penitent. There is a public interest in these
communications remaining confidential. However, it will
usually be outweighed by a stronger public interest in the
administration of justice, that criminal trials should convict
the guilty and acquit the innocent; that civil trials should
allow recovery where the claimant is entitled to it, and not8
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otherwise. What is distinctive about confidential
communications between a lawyer and client, where no
litigation is pending or contemplated, which makes them
different?
The Court of Appeal’s answer to this question had been:
even where no litigation is pending or contemplated,
litigation may later arise; and it would be wrong for the
client’s position in that litigation to be prejudiced by the
disclosure of earlier communications with his lawyer. Thus,
it concluded, there was no justification for the rule if the
communications with his lawyer concerned a matter that
could not form the basis of litigation.
The House of Lords rejected this narrow policy
justification. But it is not immediately apparent that
domestic authority alone could conclusively establish a
wider base. In R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B Lord
Taylor of Gosforth CJ said:
“In Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317 the basic principle
justifying legal professional privilege was again said to be that
a client should be able to obtain legal advice in confidence.
The principle which runs through all these cases … is that a
man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since
otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must
be sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never
be revealed without his consent (p 507).”
In R (Morgan Grenfell Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income
Tax Lord Hoffmann referred to legal professional privilege
as “a necessary corollary of the right of any person to
obtain skilled advice about the law’ and continued (p 607):
“Such advice cannot be effectively obtained unless the client is
able to put all the facts before the adviser without fear that
they may afterwards be disclosed and used to his prejudice.”
And in B v Auckland District Law Society [2003] 2 AC 736-
Lord Millett justified legal professional privilege on the
ground that
“ … a lawyer must be able to give his client an absolute and
unqualified assurance that whatever the client tells him in
confidence will never be disclosed without his consent.”
However, these statements of principle focus on a
relatively narrow, private right and benefit of confidential
legal advice to be gained through the application of
privilege. There is nothing in them to explain why they
cease to be true if, for example, “lawyer” is replaced with
“doctor”, mutatis mutandis.
Lord Scott found a broader policy explanation in cases
from other jurisdictions. In Upjohn Co v United States (1981)
449 US 383, a decision of the US Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist said that the purpose of legal professional
privilege was:
“… to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”
Justice Rehnquist went on:
“The privilege recognises that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client.”
Leading cases in Australia and New Zealand justify the
rule on a broader policy basis than merely the need to
ensure candour, and most clearly emphasise the social
context. For example, in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR
52, a decision of the High Court of Australia, Murphy J
commented that:
“The client’s legal privilege is essential for the orderly and
dignified conduct of individual affairs in a social atmosphere
which is being poisoned by official and unofficial
eavesdropping and other invasions of privacy,”
and Wilson J said:
“In fostering the confidential relationship in which legal
advice is given and received the common law is serving the
ends of justice because it is facilitating the orderly
arrangement of the client’s affairs as a member of the
community.”
Finally, the concept of legal professional privilege has
been absorbed into the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice, where in A M & S Europe Ltd v European
Commission [1983] QB 878 Slynn A-G said:
“[The privilege] springs essentially from the basic need of a
man in a civilised society to be able to turn to his lawyer for
advice and help, and if proceedings begin, for representation;
it springs no less from the advantages to a society which
evolves complex law reaching into all the business affairs of
persons, real and legal, that they should be able to know
what they can do under the law, what is forbidden, where they
must tread circumspectly, where they run risks.”
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry cited a passage from Sir
George Mackenzie’s Works, Volume 2 (1755) which hints
at the wider social context, while still drawing parallels
with other recipients of confidences:
“An Advocate is by the Nature of his Imployment tied to the
same Faithfulness that any Depositor is: For his Client has
depositate in his Breast his greatest Secrets; and it is the
Interest of the Common-wealth, to have that Freedom allowed
and secured without which Men cannot manage their Affairs
and private Business: And who would use that Freedom if they
might be ensnared by it?”
Lord Rodger added (at para [54]):
“… the public interest justification for the privilege is the
same today as it was 350 years ago: it does not change, or
need to change, because it is rooted in an aspect of human
nature which does not change either.” 9
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At paragraph [34], Lord Scott of Foscote endorsed this
wider policy justification for privilege, in a paragraph worth
quoting in its entirety:
“None of these judicial dicta tie the justification for legal
advice privilege to the conduct of litigation. They recognise
that in the complex world in which we live there are a
multitude of reasons why individuals, whether humble or
powerful, or corporations, whether large or small, may need to
seek the advice or assistance of lawyers in connection with
their affairs; they recognise that the seeking and giving of this
advice so that the clients may achieve an orderly arrangement
of their affairs is strongly in the public interest; they recognise
that in order for the advice to bring about that desirable
result it is essential that the full and complete facts are placed
before the lawyers who are to give it; and they recognise that
unless the clients can be assured that what they tell their
lawyers will not be disclosed by the lawyers without their (the
clients’) consent, there will be cases in which the requisite
candour will be absent. It is obviously true that in very many
cases clients would have no inhibitions in providing their
lawyers with all the facts and information the lawyers might
need whether or not there were the absolute assurance of non-
disclosure that the present law of privilege provides. But the
dicta to which I have referred all have in common the idea
that it is necessary in our society, a society in which the
restraining and controlling framework is built upon a belief in
the rule of law, that communications between clients and
lawyers, whereby the clients are hoping for the assistance of
the lawyers’ legal skills in the management of their (the
clients’) affairs, should be secure against the possibility of any
scrutiny from others, whether the police, the executive,
business competitors, inquisitive busy-bodies or anyone else
(see also paras 15.8 to 15.10 of Adrian Zuckerman’s Civil
Procedure where the author refers to the rationale underlying
legal advice privilege as ‘the rule of law rationale’). I, for my
part, subscribe to this idea. It justifies, in my opinion, the
retention of legal advice privilege in our law, notwithstanding
that as a result cases may sometimes have to be decided in
ignorance of relevant probative material.”
That being the case, the scope of legal advice privilege
must reflect the policy reasons that justify the rule.
Scope of legal advice privilege
The House of Lords held that the scope as identified by
the Court of Appeal failed to reflect this policy justification.
In narrow terms, the Court of Appeal had based its
conclusions on the absence of cited cases where private
rights and obligations were not engaged. However, it was
conceded for the claimants that no principled line could be
drawn between private law and public law rights and
obligations for this purpose. And that, Lord Scott found,
was sufficient to determine the appeal; for as far as the
Bank was concerned, public law rights and obligations
were engaged on two distinct levels. First, the Bingham
Inquiry was to examine whether the Bank had properly
discharged its public law duties of supervision imposed by
the Banking Acts. Second, the inquiry itself was subject to
judicial review; and as Lord Scott noted, it would be absurd
if privilege were not to attach to advice taken in order to
prevent criticism by the inquiry, given that (as is not in
doubt) it would attach to advice taken on whether such
criticism, once made, were susceptible to public law
challenge.
In broader terms, Lord Scott returned to the
formulation of Taylor LJ in Balabel, that legal advice “must
include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be
done in the relevant legal context.” While emphasising that
there must be a “relevant legal context” for privilege to
attach (that is, dealings with a solicitor as a “man of
business” will not attract privilege), he then set out how a
communication is to be identified as privileged:
“There is, in my opinion, no way of avoiding difficulty in
deciding in marginal cases whether the seeking of advice from
or the giving of advice by lawyers does or does not take place
in a relevant legal context so as to attract legal advice
privilege. In cases of doubt the judge called upon to make the
decision should ask whether the advice relates to the rights,
liabilities, obligations or remedies of the client either under
private law or under public law. If it does not, then, in my
opinion, legal advice privilege would not apply. If it does so
relate then, in my opinion, the judge should ask himself
whether the communication falls within the policy underlying
the justification for legal advice privilege in our law. Is the
occasion on which the communication takes place and is the
purpose for which it takes place such as to make it reasonable
to expect the privilege to apply? The criterion must, in my
opinion, be an objective one (para [38]).”
He held (at para [43]) that the present case was not in
the least marginal; “the presentational advice falls, in my
opinion, squarely within the policy reasons underlying legal
advice privilege.”
However, he also gave examples where, he said, the
“relevant legal context” was “clear”, or “unmistakable”,
but which, with respect, would seem to fail the in limine test
by falling outside the category of advice relating to “the
rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of the client
either under private law or under public law”. These
include advice given by lawyers to the promoters and
opponents of private legislation, and to the Government in
relation to the preparation of public bills. Other examples
could be given, such as where the advice concerned the
rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of someone other
than the client (such as the client’s child, or potential
beneficiaries under the client’s will). Lord Rodger also
pointed to the difficulty of accurately characterising advice
on criminal matters as relating, strictly speaking, to rights
and obligations of the client.
Rather than propounding a further, broader definition
which would capture these and other examples, it may be
more convenient to leave the Balabel test of “relevant legal10
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context” undefined, while using the examples given by
Lord Scott to indicate that the concept is not to be
narrowly applied.
Did Freshfields’ advice meet the Court of Appeal
test?
Because of the conclusions the House reached on the
scope of privilege, it was not strictly necessary to consider
the Bank’s second submission, that the test propounded by
the Court of Appeal, narrow though it be, nevertheless
covered the advice given by Freshfields. Lord Carswell
considered that the advice given did, indeed, relate to the
Bank’s legal position. He noted that the Bank was
potentially liable in both private and public law for the
performance of its functions, and said (at para [80]):
“The focus of the inquiry was always going to be a critical
examination of the Bank’s performance of its supervisory
duties under the Banking Acts. It was apparent that some
would seek to attach blame to the Bank for failing to take
earlier action – the then Prime Minister stated in the House
of Commons that the inquiry would ‘determine where the
blame lies’ – and that public criticism in the inquiry report of
the conduct of some officials was a distinct possibility. Nor
could one rule out the possibility that some amendment,
which might be unwelcome to the Bank, of its regulatory
powers and duties might be recommended.”
He concluded that Tomlinson J, at first instance, had
been right to say:
“Anything that the Bank did and said in relation to the
inquiry was potentially of great legal sensitivity. It was an
inquiry one outcome of which could be criticism of the conduct
of the Bank from an informed and highly authoritative source,
an outcome which would not only be of some importance in
relation to the Bank’s ongoing regulatory and supervisory role
but would itself be likely either to lead to or to encourage the
institution or attempted institution of proceeding against the
Bank by depositors and others who had lost money in
consequence of the collapse of BCCI” (para [7]).
There is a further, and more general, question to be
asked, of interest to those participating in inquiries where
there is no question of liability but a real danger of damage
to reputation. In these circumstances, the advice and
assistance of lawyers are still recognised as being beneficial
(see the “Salmon principles” mentioned above); but are
the communications in the seeking and giving of such legal
advice privileged? The Court of Appeal left this open.
Having asked (para [32]):
‘Is reputation to be equated with legal rights and obligations
so that the advice of a solicitor for the purpose of protecting
reputation attracts legal advice privilege?’
the court found it unnecessary to answer the question
on the facts of the case, as the court thought it
“questionable as to whether our private law affords any
protection to the reputation of the Bank.” Certainly, the
court went on, it is not afforded the same protection as the
reputation of an individual through the law of defamation.
While it is would seem right that the Bank of England is a
public authority falling within the rule in Derbyshire County
Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, it does not
follow that it has no reputation protected by the law. The
House of Lords in the Derbyshire case expressly reserved the
possibility of public authorities, although unable to protect
their reputation through a civil action for defamation,
having their reputations recognised and protected through
actions for malicious falsehood; defamation actions by
individual employees and officers; and prosecutions for
criminal libel.
In the House of Lords, Lord Scott was more forthright.
Having concluded that the presentational advice given by
Freshfields was “advice as to what should prudently and
sensibly be done in the relevant legal context”, he went on:
“I would be of the same opinion in relation to presentational
advice sought from lawyers by any individual or company who
believed himself, herself or itself to be at risk of criticism by an
inquiry, whether a coroner’s inquest, a statutory inquiry
under the 1921 Act or an ad hoc inquiry such as the
Bingham Inquiry. The defence of personal reputation and
integrity is at least as important to many individuals and
companies as the pursuit or defence of legal rights whether
under private law or public law (para [44]).”
The test of relative importance to the individual,
subjectively measured, is, of course, questionable. If asked
which was more “important”, many might reply that the
protection of confidential communications with a priest,
therapist or doctor was more relevant and important to
them than those with a lawyer.
Having said that, the conclusion must be right. It has
sometimes been considered that, in the balance between
the right to free expression and the right to reputation, free
expression (guaranteed by Art 10 of the European
Convention) must necessarily take priority. The latter is,
after all, recognised as a right by the Convention, but only
to the extent that it is one of the grounds set out in Article
10(2) on which the prior right, of freedom of expression,
may be limited. That limitation must be restricted to what
is “necessary in a democratic society”; and further, it may
protect “the rights or reputation of others”, suggesting that
the latter may not be included in the former.
That position is, at the least, now open to argument. In
Radio France v France ECHR 53984/00, 31 June 2004, at
para 31, the Strasbourg court underlined that the right to
a reputation is part of that bundle of rights which
comprises the Article 8 right to respect for a private life.
And the domestic courts have now firmly established that
in conflicts between these two fundamental rights, there is
a delicate balancing exercise to be carried out; there is no
presumption that freedom of expression outweighs privacy.
(See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, and the pithy 11
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summary by Lord Steyn in re S (a child) (identification:
restriction on publication) [2004] UKHL 47 at para [17]).
In any case, it should be clear that the right to a
reputation is a private law right which is capable of forming
the subject of litigation; and that legal advice on the
protection of that right is therefore privileged.
Legal advice privilege and corporate bodies
The House of Lords was invited to comment on the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Three Rivers (No 5), that
only the BIU constituted Freshfields’ clients for the
purpose of legal advice privilege, and that other employees
or ex-employees were to be regarded as third parties such
that their communications did not attract privilege. The
House carefully refused to be drawn into the question.
Lord Scott explained (at para [47]):
“First, the issue is a difficult one with different views, leading
to diametrically opposed conclusions, being eminently
arguable. Second, there is a dearth of domestic authority.
Upjohn Co v United States (1981) 449 US 383 in the
United States Supreme Court constitutes a valuable authority
in a common law jurisdiction but whether (or to what extent)
the principles there expressed should be accepted and applied
in this jurisdiction is debatable. Third, whatever views your
Lordships may express, and with whatever unanimity, the
views will not constitute precedent binding on the lower
courts. The guiding precedent on the issue will continue to be
the Court of Appeal judgment in Three Rivers (No 5).
Fourth, if and when the issue does come before the House (or
a new Supreme Court) the panel of five who sit on the case
may or may not share the views of your Lordships, or a
majority of your Lordships, sitting on this appeal. Fifth, and
finally, this House, represented by an Appeal Committee of
three, refused leave to appeal against the Three Rivers (No
5) judgment.”
This leaves open an important question, particularly for
corporate bodies, which can only ever act, or
communicate, through employees or officers: when dealing
with its legal advisers, what must it do to ensure that
communications are privileged? The question – and,
ultimately, the correctness of the Court of Appeal decision
– remains open to argument.
Litigation privilege
Litigation privilege was not in issue, as the Bank had
always conceded that the Bingham Inquiry was not
“litigation”. But despite this, Lord Scott picked up on a
remark of Lord Phillips MR, to the effect that the policy
justification for litigation privilege was readily understood.
He went on to comment (at para [29]):
“As to the justification for litigation privilege, I would
respectfully agree that the need to afford privilege to the
seeking or giving of legal advice for the purposes of actual or
contemplated litigation is easy to understand. I do not,
however, agree that that is so in relation to those documents
or communications which although having the requisite
connection with litigation neither constitute nor disclose the
seeking or giving of legal advice. Communications between
litigant and third parties are the obvious example. This
House in in re L [1997] AC 16 restricted litigation
privilege to communications or documents with the requisite
connection to adversarial proceedings. Civil litigation
conducted pursuant to the current Civil Procedure Rules is in
many respects no longer adversarial. The decision in in re L
warrants, in my opinion, a new look at the justification for
litigation privilege. But that is for another day. It does not
arise on this appeal.”
At a stroke, this introduces potentially massive
uncertainty into an area which – the impact of re L aside –
had been thought to be relatively settled (and had been
deliberately left unscathed by the Court of Appeal in its
judgments on legal advice privilege). It clearly invites
further consideration by the courts of attempts to restrict
the scope of litigation privilege, at least in relation to civil
proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS
There is much to be welcomed in the House of Lords
decision. The policy basis for legal advice privilege has been
restated, and now encompasses the public interest as well
as the private interest in the free flow of information and
advice between legal adviser and client. The resulting
breadth of justification is mirrored in the breadth of the
scope of privilege. In asking whether privilege applies to a
particular communication, it is not necessary to identify
private law rights and obligations such as can become the
subject of litigation; it is merely necessary to identify a
“relevant legal context” – which is a broad concept.
However, there remain several areas which are pregnant
with potential for further satellite litigation. First, it
remains to be seen whether the House of Lords has
indicated sufficiently clearly the criteria by which
practitioners, clients and the courts are to identify a
“relevant legal context” to distinguish privileged from non-
privileged communications. Secondly, the detailed oral
argument, and the various written interventions, on the
dichotomy between a corporate body and its officers and
employees for the purposes of legal advice privilege did not
move the House to comment on this question. It seems
inevitable that, sooner rather than later, this question will
fall to be reconsidered. And finally, an invitation has been
issued to those wishing to restrict the application of
litigation privilege in civil proceedings.
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